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Abstract 
European Commission‘s current practice of Impact Assessment (IA) considers three main 
objectives i.e. efficiency, effectiveness (including proportionality) and coherence and it is 
based on the assessment of various broad impacts such as economic, environmental and 
social  (including distribution of costs and benefits among social actors) ones. There is no 
doubt that IA is multidimensional in nature and as a consequence, multi-criteria 
evaluation (MCE), and in particular social multi-criteria evaluation (SMCE), which has 
been explicitly designed for public policy, can be a very useful methodological and 
operational framework. SMCE tries to integrate different scientific approaches with social 
actors’ preferences, thus being a consistent and transparent framework for both inter-
disciplinarity and public participation. This report aims at presenting: 
- A methodological framework where the hierarchical structure of the option comparison 
step of a typical ex-ante IA (including dimensions, objectives and evaluation criteria) is 
clarified as much as possible by means of well-established concepts in the decision 
theory literature. This might help in increasing the degree of homogeneity across IA 
studies. 
- A measurement framework where  
1. the various criterion scores can assess impacts by using both quantitative (e.g. as 
result of simulation models) and qualitative (e.g. results of participatory 
techniques) information, and  
2. the mathematical aggregation rule guarantees consistency and transparency of 
results. 
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1 Introduction 
European Commission’s current practice of Impact Assessment (IA) considers three main 
objectives i.e. efficiency, effectiveness (including proportionality) and coherence. 
Moreover IA includes various broad impacts such as economic, environmental and social 
ones. There is no doubt that IA is multidimensional in nature, and as a consequence, 
multi-criteria evaluation (MCE), and in particular social multi-criteria evaluation (SMCE), 
which has been explicitly designed for public policy, can be a very useful methodological 
and operational framework. The main achievement of SMCE is the fact that the use of 
various evaluation criteria has a direct translation in terms of plurality of values and 
dimensions used in the evaluation exercise. SMCE accomplishes the goals of being 
inter/multi-disciplinary (with respect to the research team), participatory (with respect to 
the community) and transparent (since all criteria are presented in their original form 
without any transformations in money, energy or whatever common measurement rod) 
(Munda, 2004, 2008, 2016).  
Of course, policy ex-ante evaluation/assessment is not a one-shot activity. On the 
contrary, it takes place as a learning process which is usually highly dynamic, so that 
judgements regarding the political relevance of items, alternatives or impacts may 
present sudden changes, hence requiring a policy analysis to be flexible and adaptive in 
nature. This is the reason why evaluation/assessment processes have a cyclic nature. By 
this is meant the possible adaptation of elements of the process due to continuous 
feedback loops among the various steps and consultations among the actors involved. In 
this framework, mathematical models still play a very important role, i.e. the one of 
guaranteeing consistency between assumptions used and results obtained. In general, in 
a multi-criterion problem, there is no solution optimising all the criteria at the same time 
(ideal or utopia solution), and therefore “compromise solutions” have to be found (Roy, 
1996). 
Let‘s introduce multi-criteria evaluation by means of a simple everyday life example. 
Let’s imagine staying in front of a shop and looking at a set of jackets one likes. Which 
will be the next step? Probably enter the shop and ask for the price. At this point, we 
have two possibilities: to leave the shop because we think that the price is too high or to 
accept the price as a reasonable one. In the second case, we still need to choose the 
jacket we want from the original set (of e.g. ten jackets). Thus, probably we are going to 
try the jackets and see which one fits better aesthetically to our body. Let’s assume that 
we are still undecided among four of them and for sure we do not like the other six. How 
do we choose among the four which are indifferent? Maybe at this stage we will use the 
criterion colour. Let’s imagine we are still indifferent between two jackets. Probably now 
we will look at the quality of the textile composition and we will finally choose the one 
with the higher quality. This is an example of a selection of a final alternative by using a 
peculiar multi-criterion aggregation rule, called the lexicographic model. This model 
refers to the procedure used to put in order the words in a dictionary, the first letter 
playing the role of the first criterion, the second letter, the second criterion, and so on. In 
the lexicographic model, all actions are first ranked by means of the first criterion, and 
then if some indifferent actions exist, these are further explored by means of the second 
criterion, and so on. Lexicographic orders usually lead to a straightforward selection of 
the most preferred alternative; however, most of the information collected on 
alternatives will not play a role in the evaluation process. 
Let’s discuss this example a bit and draw some conclusions. First of all, did we 
experience sometimes a decision process like this one? Probably yes, even if not with 
these criteria or in this order. Thus apparently human beings use multi-criteria evaluation 
without any formal knowledge of it; we could then state that it is a behavioural 
assumption with a high degree of real-world descriptive content. Secondly, does the 
order of criteria have any influence on the final alternative selected? Of course it does. If 
one starts with the quality criterion instead of price the jacket selected will probably be 
the most expensive one. This shows that when using various criteria human beings do 
not necessarily attach to them the same weight. In the case of the lexicographic model, 
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in principle the first criterion alone could be enough to select the preferred solution (i.e. if 
only one jacket has the price we are willing to pay), this implies that its weight is much 
higher than any other criterion used in the selection process. This is the reason why the 
first criterion is sometimes called the “dictator”. Clearly then, the order of consideration 
of criteria determines their relative weights. Thirdly, what happens in our example if we 
do not like the overall characteristics of the selected jacket finally? Probably we will start 
again the process e.g. changing the order of criteria (i.e. their weight), thus for example, 
accepting to pay a higher price. Again this is something that we have probably 
experienced and which shows that what really matters is the learning process and not 
the alternative finally selected. This latter one is constructed by means of the decision 
process and not discovered as a global optimum.  
Finally, does the lexicographic method allow for any compensability among the various 
criteria considered? Intuitively, compensability refers to the possibility that some bad 
criterion scores can be compensated by other very good criterion scores. For example, an 
overall student evaluation can be based on the principle that a very bad score in 
mathematics (let’s say a 2 in a 0-10 scale) can be compensated by a 10 in literature and 
thus the student can pass the final evaluation. This evaluation system is a completely 
compensatory one. On the contrary, an evaluation system can alternatively be based on 
the principle that a student has to be “enough good” in all the subjects and a 2 in 
mathematics cannot be compensated by any other score, however high. This second 
evaluation system would be a partial compensatory one. Compensability then assumes a 
certain degree of mutual interaction among the criterion scores, if no such interaction is 
possible, no compensability exists. Since in a lexicographic method the evaluation criteria 
are not considered simultaneously, this procedure is completely non-compensatory. 
Compensability is a very important concept when multi-criteria evaluation is applied to 
integrate various policy dimensions. For example, in evaluating a policy option, if we 
consider that 2 in mathematics could be a very bad environmental impact and 10 in 
literature a very good economic impact, it is clear that allowing or not for compensability 
and to which degree is the central issue in evaluation exercises.  
To search for compromises implies that no-dictator must exist. That is, all the criteria 
relevant in a policy problem have to be used simultaneously and not in a lexicographic 
order, since otherwise some criteria will have a much higher weight a priori. Thus for 
example, a legislative system which foresees that a financial analysis of projects has to 
be done before the evaluation of their environmental impacts, it is indeed prioritizing the 
economic dimension with respect to the environmental one. Multi-criteria evaluation for 
ex-ante evaluation/impact assessment must then be based on more general models than 
the lexicographic one, allowing the use of different objectives and criteria at the same 
time. 
The present report aims at developing a SMCE operational framework useful for 
answering the following key question: how can the Commission integrate a plurality of 
technical aspects and social views into its ex-ante impact assessment in a coherent and 
transparent manner (coherence and transparency being key Better Regulation 
requirements)? Section 2 illustrates the main concepts of MCE and their adaptation to 
structure an IA exercise. Section 3 presents a measurement framework where the 
various criterion scores can be both qualitative and quantitative, and the mathematical 
aggregation rule is as consistent and simple as possible. Section 4 presents an illustrative 
example and finally some conclusions are drawn. 
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2 The Hierarchical Structure of ex-ante Impact Assessment 
Commission Impact Assessment is based on three main objectives:  
1. effectiveness (i.e. the degree to which the policy objectives are achieved (in terms 
of goals or levels of output) and the problems identified are solved,  
2. efficiency (the EC has expressed its commitment to ensure that its proposals meet 
policy goals at minimum cost and/or taking into account an analysis of costs and 
benefits, and their distribution among the stakeholders affected) and  
3. coherence (with other existing EU policies).  
Correctly both the objectives of effectiveness and of efficiency are considered jointly; 
otherwise there is the risk to drive the policy evaluation framework towards a situation in 
which efficiency would be privileged at the cost of effectiveness (focusing on just “cheap” 
options, regardless of the level of output/outcomes achieved).  
The objective of fairness is not considered explicitly, although probably it should be dealt 
with too. Given the existence of a plurality of social actors, who have different stakes in 
the policy being assessed, a conflictual situation frequently arises; thus distributional 
issues always play a central role - hence the BR guidelines/toobox's recommendation of 
not assessing only global efficiency but also to ensure that the distribution of costs and 
benefits among the stakeholders affected is deemed acceptable.  
Any social decision problem is characterized by conflicts between competing values, 
perspectives, interests and different groups and communities that represent them. Any 
policy option generally implies winners and losers, thus it is important to check if a policy 
option might be preferred just because some dimensions (e.g. the environmental) or 
some social groups (e.g. the lower income groups) are not taken into account in the 
analysis; ignoring some evidently existing dimensions is considered more and more 
unacceptable in a public policy context in general, and in the Commission in particularly - 
as e.g. recently emphasized in the European Pillar of Social Rights. In my opinion, explicit 
inclusion of fairness within an IA framework mainly implies that a) social values, interests 
and desires should be considered as much as possible, b) distributional issues should be 
explored at the highest degree possible and c) the whole ex ante evaluation/impact 
assessment process should be transparent.  
Let us now look at the options' comparison step in Commission IAs, such as the ones 
represented in Tables from 1 to 8, taken from published IA studies. 
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Table 1. Example of comparison of options to increase the use of renewable energy  
Source: SWD(2016) 418 final, p. 119 
 
 
Table 2.  Example of comparison of options to protect workers from leukaemia risk 
 Source: SWD(2016) 152 final, p. 41  
 
 
Table 3. Example of comparison of options for mercury regulation 
Source: SWD(2016) 17 final, p. 44 
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Table 4. Example of comparison of options for greenhouse gas emission reduction 
Source: SWD(2015) 135 final, p. 52 
 
Table 5. Example of comparison of options for the Innovation Fund 
Source: SWD(2015) 135 final, p. 69 
 
Table 6. Example of comparison of options for the Modernisation Fund 
Source: SWD(2015) 135 final, p. 81 
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Table 7. Example of macro-economic comparison of options for maternity leave 
Source: SWD(2017) 202 final, p. 77 
 
 
Table 8. Example of comparison of options for maternity leave 
Source: SWD(2017) 202 final, p. 78 
 
As one can see there is some inconsistency in the terminology used. For example, 
efficiency, effectiveness and coherence are classified as objectives or criteria across 
different studies. The same applies to social, economic and environmental impacts, which 
may be classified as criteria or objectives, while other studies use more specific 
evaluation criteria. Let us then introduce some standard concepts from decision theory 
literature, which can help in eliminating confusion and in increasing homogeneity across 
IA studies (see e.g. Figueira et al., 2016; Roy, 1996; Vincke, 1992). 
“Dimension” is the highest hierarchical level of analysis and indicates the scope of 
objectives, criteria and criterion scores. In IA studies, the general categories of 
economic, social and environmental impacts should be considered as dimensions. 
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“Objective” indicates the direction of change desired. For example, within the economic 
dimension economic growth has to be incentivised; within the environmental dimension 
contribution to the EU's climate change commitments in the context of COP 21 has to be 
maximised; in the energy dimension, energy security should be maximised. In impact 
assessment, effectiveness, efficiency and coherence have to be considered objectives 
clearly. In the example shown in table 5, “minimise complexity ..” is an objective and not 
an evaluation criterion. 
“Evaluation criterion” is the basis for evaluation in relation to a given objective (any 
objective may imply a number of different criteria). It is a function that associates each 
policy option with a variable indicating its desirability according to expected 
consequences related to the same objective, a classical example in the economic 
dimension might be GDP, saving rate and inflation rate inside the objective “growth 
maximization”.  The examples shown in Tables 4 and 7 are based on this notion of 
evaluation criteria. 
“Criterion score” is an assessment of the impact consistent with a given criterion with 
reference to a policy option to be evaluated. It is a measurement deriving from a process 
that represents, at a given point in space and time, a shared perception of a real-world 
state of affairs. To give an example, when comparing two countries, within the economic 
dimension, one objective could be “maximization of economic growth”; the criterion 
might be research and development performance, the criterion score could be “number of 
patents per million of inhabitants”.  Criterion scores can be both qualitative (as in most of 
current IA studies) or quantitative. Uncertainty (stochastic or fuzzy) can also be included.  
“Constraint” is a limit on the values that criterion scores may assume; it may or may not 
be stated mathematically. For example, in IA, political feasibility in terms of respect of 
the principles of proportionality and subsidiarity can be seen as a constraint. 
“Goal” is synonymous with a target and is something that can be either achieved or 
missed, e.g. at least 95% of children (from 4 to compulsory school age) should 
participate in early childhood education, the rate of early leavers from education and 
training aged 18-24 should be below 10%. If a goal cannot, or is unlikely to, be 
achieved, it may be converted to an objective. “Attribute” is a measure that indicates 
whether goals have been met or not. Attributes and goal can then be used for measuring 
effectiveness.  
By using these concepts, a typical IA study can be represented as the hierarchical 
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Figure  1. A Schematized Vision of the Hierarchical Structure of an ex-ante IA 
 
An important consequence of this hierarchical problem structuring is on criterion 
weighting. A common practice is the pragmatic solution of no criterion weighting. This 
approach normally reduces conflicts in the problem structuring step, but the question 
here is: is it correct?  
Indeed the fact that all criteria have the same weight does not guarantee at all that 
objectives and dimensions have the same weight. This would be guaranteed only under 
the condition that all the dimensions have the same number of criteria. This of course is 
quite unnatural and artificial and even dangerous. Analysts could be tempted to choose 
the same number of criteria for each dimension even if these criteria were completely 
redundant.  
The conclusion can thus be drawn that by giving the same weight to all the criteria the 
different dimensions have different weights (since any dimension is then weighted 
according to its number of criteria). On the contrary different criterion weights can 
guarantee that all the dimensions are considered equal!  
A reasonable practice can be to start by giving the same weight to each dimension and 
then splitting each weight among the objectives and criteria of any dimension 
proportionally1. Of course, one could assume that some dimensions are more important 
than other ones, and thus their weight should be higher, but this should be justified 
based on strong and transparent ethical, scientific, institutional or legal arguments.  
This also implies that sensitivity or robustness analyses have to check the consequences 
for the final ranking of these arguments and not of all the possible combinations of 
weights. Sensitivity and robustness analysis are thus a way to improve transparency on 




                                           
1 In this framework weights are meaningful only as importance coefficients and not as trade-offs (see Annex 2). 
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3 A SMCE based Measurement Framework for ex-ante IA 
A “discrete multi-criterion problem” can be formally described as follows (see e.g. 
Figueira et al., 2016). A is a finite set of N feasible actions (or alternatives). M is the 
number of different points of view, or evaluation criteria, gm, that are considered relevant 
to a specific policy problem. Where action a is evaluated to be better than action b (both 
belonging to the set A), by the m-th point of view, then gm(a)>gm(b). In this way a 
decision problem may be represented in an N by M matrix P called an evaluation or 
impact matrix. In such a matrix, the typical element pmn (m=1, 2 , ... , M; n=1, 2 , ... , 
N) represents the evaluation of the n-th alternative by means of the m-th criterion, in 
other words,  each criterion score represents the performance of each alternative 
according to each criterion (see Table 9). The impact matrix may include quantitative, 
qualitative or both types of information.  
 
  Alternatives    
Criteria Units a1 a2 a3 a4 
g1  g1(a1) g1(a2) . g1(a4) 
g2  . . . . 
g3  . . . . 
g4  . . . . 
g5  . . . . 
g6  g6(a1) g6(a2) . g6(a4) 
Table 9. Example of an Impact Matrix 
 
In a discrete multi-criteria problem, there is a range of multi-criteria problem 
formulations, which may take one of the following forms (Roy, 1996): 
() the aim is to identify one and only one final alternative; 
() the aim is the assignment of each alternative to an appropriate predefined category 
according to what one wants it to become afterwards (for instance, acceptance, rejection 
or delay for additional information); 
() the aim is to rank all feasible alternatives according to a total or partial pre-order; 
() the aim is to describe relevant alternatives and their consequences. 
The importance of mathematical approaches in SMCE is their ability to allow a consistent 
aggregation of the diverse information. Otherwise, even if everybody would agree on the 
considerations contained in the previous Section, their implementation in a real-world 
assessment exercise would be impossible. Just to give an example of the typical 
difficulties we may find when solving multi-criterion problems, let’s look at the numerical 
example shown in Table 10, where 21 criteria rank four alternatives (a, b, c, d). Criteria 
are grouped according to the ranking they support (i.e. 3 criteria are in favour of  abcd, 
while 7 in favour of bdca, and so on). 
 
 
Table 10 Numerical Example with 21 Criteria and 4 Alternatives  
(Source: Moulin, 1988, p. 228) 
Number of criteria 3 5 7 6 
 a a b c 
 b c d b 
 c b c d 
 d d a a 
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We can assume that the objective is to isolate one alternative (-decision problem 
formulation). A first possibility is to apply the so-called plurality rule, meaning that the 
alternative which is most often ranked in first place is the winner. Thus, in our case, 
alternative a would be chosen since eight criteria put it in first position. However, if one 
looks carefully at Table 10, it can be seen that alternative a also has the strongest 
opposition, since 13 criteria put it in last position. 
From this plurality rule paradox two main lessons can be learned: 
1. Good ranking procedures should respect the entire ranking of alternatives and not 
the first position only. 
2. It is important to consider not only what a majority of criteria prefer, but also 
what they reject. 
A multi-criteria mathematical procedure is an aggregate of all objectives (or goals), 
criteria (or attributes) and criterion scores. Given that in a multi-criterion problem, there 
is no ideal solution (at least in the majority of cases), assessing the quality of multi-
criteria mathematical procedures is impossible, either based on a notion of approximation 
(i.e., discovering pre-existing truths) or on a mathematical property of convergence (i.e., 
does the decision automatically lead, in a finite number of steps, to the optimum a*?).  
In 1986 Kenneth Arrow and Hervé Raynaud published a very influential book titled 
“Social choice and multicriterion decision-making”, where the formal analogies between 
the multi-criterion problem and the social choice one are analysed deeply. This book is 
based on the assumption that, in the case where all criteria have ordinal impact scores, if 
one considers the evaluation criteria as voters, a multi-criteria impact matrix and a 
voting matrix are identical.  
As a consequence all results of social choice also apply to multi-criteria evaluation fully; 
in particular Arrow’s impossibility theorem stating that there is no perfect mathematical 
aggregation rule. Thus, unlike other mathematical fields, neither approximation nor 
convergence criteria can be used; only “reasonable” mathematical procedures can be 
developed in this framework. Reasonable here means that algorithms can be evaluated 
not only according to the formal properties they present, but, overall, according to the 
empirical consequences implied by their use.  
Here, I will try to isolate some properties that can be considered desirable for a discrete 
multi-criteria aggregation rule (often called multi-criteria method) in the framework of 
Commission ex-ante IA. In synthesis, the information contained in the impact matrix 
useful for solving the so-called multi-criterion problem is: 
• Intensity of preference (when quantitative criterion scores are present). 
• Number of criteria in favour of a given alternative. 
• Weight attached to each single criterion. 
• Relationship of each single alternative with all the other alternatives. 
 
Combinations of this information generate different aggregation conventions, i.e. 
manipulation rules of the available information to arrive at a preference structure. The 
aggregation of several criteria implies taking a position on the fundamental issue of 
compensability. As we have already observed in the Introduction, complete 
compensability is not desirable for the problem we are dealing with, since it implies that 
e.g. a good performance on efficiency would offset a very bad one on effectiveness or 
vice versa. On the other hand, complete non-compensability is not desirable either, since 
it would imply the use of a lexicographic model and the consequent choice of a “dictator”, 
e.g. efficiency.  
As a consequence, the only option left is the use of partial compensatory methods, such 
as the "outranking methods", including e.g. ELECTRE (Roy, 1996) and PROMETHEE 
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(Brans et al., 1986).  These methods, following the Condorcet tradition, entail 
aggregating the criteria into a partial binary relation aSb (an outranking relation) based 
on concordance and discordance indexes, and then "exploiting" this relationship. Each of 
these two steps may be treated in a number of ways according to the problem 
formulation and the particular case under consideration. 
To illustrate this approach consider Parliamentary voting. The concordant coalition can be 
considered as the sum of the votes of the members in favour of a given option; according 
to a majority voting rule this option will be approved if it obtains more than 50% of the 
votes. According to the normative tradition in political philosophy, all coalitions, however 
small, should be given some fraction of the decision power. One measure of this power is 
the ability to veto certain subsets of outcomes. This explains the use of the condition of 
non-discordance.  
In practice, the effect of the discordance test is that even if M-1 criteria support the 
recommendation of choosing a over b, this recommendation must not be accepted if only 
one criterion is against it with a strength bigger than the veto threshold. This implies that 
in a situation where all criteria would support a policy option, this option cannot be 
accepted if one criterion is very strongly against this option. Of course, this depends on 
the way in which “very strongly” is defined, i.e. the definition of the veto threshold. 
It has been argued that the presence of qualitative information in evaluation problems 
concerning socio-economic issues is a rule, rather than an exception (Nijkamp et al., 
1990). Thus there is a clear need for methods that are able to take into account 
information of a "mixed" type (both qualitative and quantitative criterion scores). For 
simplicity, we refer to qualitative information as information measured on a nominal or 
ordinal scale, and to quantitative information as information measured on an interval or 
ratio scale.  
Moreover, ideally, this information should be precise, certain, exhaustive and 
unequivocal. But in reality, it is often necessary to use information which does not have 
those characteristics so that one has to face the uncertainty of a stochastic and/or fuzzy 
nature present in the data. As a consequence, multi-criteria methods able to tackle 
consistently the widest types of mixed information should be considered as desirable 
ones. 
In the 1990s some outranking methods were especially designed to address public policy 
analysis, one of the most widespread being NAIADE2 (Munda, 1995). It is a discrete 
multi-criteria method whose impact matrix may include crisp, stochastic or fuzzy 
measurements of the performance of an alternative with respect to an evaluation 
criterion. Thus it is very flexible for real-world applications. NAIADE can give the 
following information: 
 ranking of the alternatives according to the set of evaluation criteria (i.e. technical 
compromise solution/s); 
 indications of the distance of the positions of the various interest groups (i.e. 
possibilities of convergence of interests or coalition formations); 
 ranking of the alternatives according to actors’ impacts or preferences (i.e. social 
compromise solution/s). 
From a mathematical point of view, two main issues are solved: 
1. the problem of equivalence of the procedures used in order to standardize the 
mixed criterion scores; 
2. the problem of comparison of fuzzy numbers typical of all fuzzy multi-criteria 
methods. 
                                           
2 NAIADE (Novel Approach to Imprecise Assessment and Decision Environments), Patent Number: SN 2544 
since 26/03/1997 at the European Commission-DG XIII D/1 (Telecommunications, information market and 
exploitation of research). 
  15 
These two issues are dealt with a new semantic distance that is useful in the case of 
continuous, convex membership functions also allowing a definite integration. 
The whole NAIADE procedure can be divided into four main steps: 
1. pair wise comparison of alternatives according to each criterion, 
2. aggregation of all criteria, 
3. ranking of alternatives, 
4. social conflict analysis. 
 
From the mathematical point of view, an interesting characteristic of NAIADE is the 
possibility to fully control the degree of compensability allowed in the aggregation 
procedure. 
The idea behind social conflict analysis is that criteria and criterion scores are not 
determined directly by social actors. The impact matrix is a result of a technical 
translation operationalized by the technical team. Even if the criteria are exactly the ones 
agreed with the social actors, the determination of the criterion scores is a technical issue 
independent of their preferences. This is one of the main reasons why it is desirable to 
combine a social impact matrix with the usual technical impact matrix normally used in a 
multi-criterion exercise. 
Two issues are connected with all the outranking methods, as well as with other 
approaches based on pair-wise comparisons. First, Arrow’s axiom of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives is not respected; thus the phenomenon of rank reversal may 
appear (i.e. the preference between a and b can change in function of the fact that a 
third option c is considered or not)3. Second, the Condorcet paradox may appear, i.e. 
alternative a may be ranked better than b, b better than c and c better than a. In 
addition, there is a problem specifically connected with the outranking approach. That is 
the necessity to establish a large number of “preference parameters”, i.e. indifference 
and preference thresholds, concordance and discordance thresholds and weights. This 
may cause a loss of transparency and consistency in the model. In the framework of 
SMCE, outranking approaches are an interesting assessment framework, but to 
guarantee consistency with the social process behind the problem structuring, the 
mathematical aggregation rules need to be kept as simple as possible (see Munda, 2008 
for a deeper technical discussion on this issue). 
 
                                           
3 Arrow's axiom of "the independence of irrelevant alternatives" states that the choice made in a given set of 
alternatives A depends only on the ordering made with respect to the alternatives in that set. Alternatives 
outside A (irrelevant since the choice must be made within A) should not affect the choice inside A. Empirical 
experience does not generally support this axiom. The issue of the independence of irrelevant alternatives is 
particularly important and tricky when pair-wise comparisons are used. To clarify this point, let’s imagine a 
football championship. To determine the winner all the teams have to compete pair-wise. Then we need to 
know the performance of each team with respect to all the others, e.g., how many times a given team won, lost 
or was even. By using this information, we can finally determine who won the championship. Let’s now imagine 
that when the championship is about to end and the team X is going to win (e.g. Barcelona), a new team Y is 
created (e.g. in Madrid). Would it be acceptable to allow this new team Y to play directly with X? Would the 
supporters of team X accept that if Y wins, then Y will also win the championship? Of course not! This example 
seems to give a clear answer to our problem, but let’s now imagine that instead of ranking football teams, our 
problem is to evaluate the performance of universities. Let’s imagine that a study is almost finalized, and 
university A is going to be top ranked; however the study team discovers that an important university 
institution Z was not present in the original data set. Now the question is: can we just compare A with Z or do 
we have to make all the pairwise comparisons again? Now the answer is less clear cut. Moreover, let’s imagine 
that the ranking at time T (without Z) ranks university A better than B and that at time T+1 (when Z is 
considered in the pair-wise comparisons) B is ranked better than A just because Z is taken into consideration! 
Can this result be acceptable? To answer this question in a definitive manner is very controversial. What we can 
say for sure is that if pair-wise comparisons are used, it has to be accepted the assumption that the irrelevant 
alternative Z (irrelevant for the evaluation between A and B) can indeed change the relative evaluation of A 
and B. This phenomenon is called “rank reversal”. 
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4 An Illustrative Example  
Let us consider as an illustrative example, an IA on modernising VAT for cross-border 
B2C e-Commerce developed recently. The impacts of the various options considered are 
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Table 11. Impact Matrix of the Illustrative example 
Source: SWD(2016) 379 final, pp. 46-48 
 
In the original study, this impact matrix is commented on qualitative grounds4 (without 
using any formal aggregation procedure) and it is concluded that “option 5 is considered 
to be the most positive as a business established in a Member State can make supplies to 
a customer in another Member State under broadly the same rules as a domestic 
transaction, the VAT rate applicable being the only exception. This option reduces overall 
compliance costs for business by 55% and evidence points to this option between the 
optimum one in terms of meeting the overall general and specific objectives of the 
proposal” (p. SWD(2016) 379 final, 48). 
Let’s now see if this conclusion is corroborated by using a mathematical aggregation rule. 
By applying NAIADE, the ranking shown in Figure 2 is obtained. Each option is 
characterised by its strength, i.e. credibility that a number of options is worse than the 
one considered (positive flow Φ+) and weakness i.e. credibility that a number of options 
is better than the one considered (negative flow Φ-). The intersection between these two 
evaluations is providing the final ranking. When two options are not connected by an 
arrow, the situation described is a so-called incomparability relation, i.e. according to the 
information available, no clear relation of preference or indifference between these two 
options can be derived. Overall, in this case it seems that it is possible to state that the 
ranking is very clear: option 5 is the best choice followed by 6 and 4; the set of options 
1, 2 and 3 is clearly the worst one. However, by looking at the degrees of strength and 
weakness, one can realise that the difference among options 4, 5 and 6 is not very 
significant. More information can be obtained by checking the pairwise comparisons, 





                                           
4 One should note that this qualitative approach is more a rule than an exception. In 17 IAs examined 
(SWD(2016) 392 final, SWD(2016) 152 final, SWD(2017) 31 final, SWD(2016) 211 final, SWD(2016) 434 final, 
SWD(2016) 410 final, SWD(2016) 418 final, SWD(2016) 173 final, SWD(2016) 303 final, SWD(2017) 26 final, 
SWD(2016) 315 final, SWD(2016) 193 final, SWD(2016) 468 final, SWD(2016) 17 final, SWD(2015) 135 final, 
SWD(2017) 202 final, SWD(2016) 379 final), only one (SWD(2016) 211 final) uses quantification (in the form 
of a mathematical aggregation rule) in ranking the considered options. All the other ones are based on a 
qualitative analysis of the various impacts, like the one described here.  
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Figure 2. Multi-criteria ranking of all options shown in Table 11 
 
In our example, the pairwise comparisons supply the results contained in Figures from    
3 to 5 and all the ones contained in Annex 1.  The first two columns report results on the 
credibility of the statement that the overall evaluation considers an option better, equal 
or worse than another one. In general an assessment is considered “credible” if its 
“degree of truth” is higher than 0.5. The third column provides the credibility of the 
evaluation referred to each single evaluation criterion. In this way, e.g. by looking at 
Figure 3, it is possible to deduce that options 4 and 5 are very similar (in technical 
terms, they are indifferent); this statement is corroborated by the first two columns. If 
one looks at the performance on each of the single criteria, it is possible to immediately 
see that only criterion 19 (business compliance costs) is in favour of option 5, while all 
the other criteria evaluate options 4 and 5 as equal. By looking at Figures 4 and 5, we 
can indeed deduce the same type of evaluation: options 4 and 6 and 5 and 6 are 
basically equal. Between options 4 and 6 all criteria are in favour of an indifference 
relation, with the exception of criterion 19, which shows a clear preference of option 6 
over 4. Between options 5 and 6 all criteria are in favour of an indifference relation, with 
a very weak credibility of a marginal preference of 5 over 6 again on criterion 19. 
Overall, on the grounds of this analysis, we can safely state that all three options are 
very similar with a slight preference attached on option 5 by criterion 19 only. This 
means that concluding that the best option is 5 implies to attach a very high weight to 
the criterion “business compliance costs” implicitly. By looking at the pairwise comparison 
shown in Annex 1, one can easily see that when comparing options 4, 5 and 6 with the 
other three, their preference is very clear, thus the clear evaluation seems to be that the 
set of options 4, 5 and 6 is definitely to be preferred to the set composed by options 1, 2 
and 3.  
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Figure 4. Pairwise comparison between options 4 and 6 
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Figure 5. Pairwise comparison between options 5 and 6 
 
To further clarify the preference structure, it is advisible to perform a robustness  
analysis according to criteria subsets (from A to D) illustrated in the original IA study. 
A) Economic Impacts 
According to this criteria subset, options 4, 5 and 6 present an incomparability relation 
among them, but it is clear that the three of them perform better than options 1, 2 and 
3.  
 
Figure 6. Multi-criteria ranking of all options according to the criteria subset A  
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B) Effectiveness 
According to the criteria subset B, options 4, 5 and 6 again present an incomparability 
relation among them and the three of them perform better than options 1, 2 and 3.  
 
 
Figure 7. Multi-criteria ranking of all options according to the criteria subset B 
 
C) Coherence 
According to this criteria subset, options 5 is better than option 4, while option 6 
presents an incomparability relation with both of them, the statement that they all 
perform better than options 1, 2 and 3 is corroborated.  
 
 
Figure 8.  Multi-criteria ranking of all options according to the criteria subset C 
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D) Key Indicators 
In this case, the ranking becomes clearer, a preference towards option 5 is derived. It 
becomes evident that this is the set of criteria that creates the preference ralation in 
favour of 5.  
 
 
Figure 9. Multi-criteria ranking of all options according to the criteria subset D 
 
As one can see, overall the statement that option 5 is a reasonable choice has been 
corroborated by the multi-criteria analysis, but it is also been clarified that this 
preference towards 5 is not very strong. All arguments to explicitate the preference 
structure to solve the impact matrix have been made clear, and no doubt the degree of 
transparency becomes much higher. Of course, the preference of option 5 over the other 
ones can also be justified by using other arguments than the ones contained in Table 11, 
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5 Conclusions 
There is no doubt that ex-ante Impact Assessment is multidimensional in nature, and as 
a consequence social multi-criteria evaluation (SMCE), which has been explicitly designed 
for public policy, can be a very useful methodological and operational framework. 
By using well established concepts in the decision theory literature, the option 
comparison step of Commission IAs, can be more homogeneous, transparent and its 
hierarchical structure be made clearer.  
The use of mathematical aggregation rules in ex-ante IA studies, has al least three 
important justifications: 
1. As clearly proved by Arrow’s theorem, even when using mathematical rules, the 
ranking of policy options cannot be straightforward. A fortiori, the risk of deriving 
somewhat wrong rankings is much higher when qualitative reasoning only is used. 
2. Even when the qualitative reasoning leads to correct conclusions, like the 
illustrative example we have examined, the use of mathematical aggregation rules 
brings more information and thus more transparency into the analysis. 
3. When using mathematical rules, consistency between the problem structuring and 
the ranking of policy options is guaranteed, this makes the overall IA study much 
more defensible. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Pairwise Comparisons of Policy Options 
 
Figure A1. Pairwise comparison between options 1 and 2 
 
 
Figure A2. Pairwise comparison between options 1 and 3 
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Figure A3. Pairwise comparison between options 1 and 4 
 
 
Figure A4. Pairwise comparison between options 1 and 5 
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Figure A5. Pairwise comparison between options 1 and 6 
 
 
Figure A6. Pairwise comparison between options 2 and 3 
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Figure A7. Pairwise comparison between options 2 and 4 
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Figure A9. Pairwise comparison between options 2 and 6 
 
 
Figure A10. Pairwise comparison between options 3 and 4 
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Figure A11. Pairwise comparison between options 3 and 5 
 
 
Figure A12. Pairwise comparison between options 3 and 6 
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Annex 2. Compensability and the Meaning of Criterion Weights 
In the decision theory literature, the concept of weights as symmetrical importance is the 
following: "… if we have two non-equal numbers to construct a vector in R2, then it is 
preferable to place the greatest number in the position corresponding to the most 
important criterion." (Podinovskii, 1994, p. 241; see also Munda, 2008 and Vincke, 
1992). 
This concept of weights as importance coefficients is very intuitive and it is how often 
weights are derived and used. However often there is a theoretical inconsistency in the 
way weights are actually used and their real theoretical meaning. In fact when one uses 
a compensatory approach in practice, such as the linear aggregation rule, one has to 
determine for each evaluation criterion, a mapping : x Rii   which provides at least 
an interval scale of measurement and to assess scaling constants (i.e. weights) in order 
to specify how the compensability should be accomplished, given the scales i  between 
the different criteria (Roberts, 1979). Note that the scaling constants which appear in the 
compensatory approach depend on the scales i , thus they do not characterise the 
intrinsic relative importance of each evaluation criterion. 
There is unanimous agreement in the literature that the only method where weights are 
computed as scaling constants and there is no ambiguous interpretation is the so-called 
trade-off method starting with revealed preferences. No weight importance judgment is 
required in this method. The trade-off method can be briefly described as follows. Let’s 
consider two options A and B, differing only for the criterion scores xk and xt. The 
problem is then to adjust the score xk for B, in such a way that A and B become 
indifferent. Formally, it is:  
' ' '' ''
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Equation (A3) is an equation in the unknown wk and wt. To compute the N weights as 
trade-offs, it is necessary to assess N-1 equivalence relations which together with the 
usual normalisation constraint  wi+ … + wn=1  determine a linear system of N equations 
in the N unknown weights. Of course if some uncertainty on the variable scores exists, 
this method cannot be applied.  
As one can easily understand to assess weights as trade-offs, as it should be always done 
when e.g. using a linear aggregation rule, it is a much harder job than to use weights as 
importance coefficients. This is probably the main reason why the standard practice 
tends to use weights as importance coefficients, even in compensatory aggregation rules 
such as the linear one but unfortunately this practice is not defensible on theoretical 
grounds. 
Vansnick (1990) showed that the two main approaches in multi-criteria aggregation 
procedures i.e., the compensatory and partial-compensatory ones can be directly derived 
from the seminal work of Borda and Condorcet. If one wants the weights to be 
interpreted as “importance coefficients” (or equivalently symmetrical importance of 
criteria) fully compensatory aggregation procedures must be avoided. From a social 
choice point of view, partial-compensatory rules are always Condorcet consistent rules. 
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